In the Civil Case of Barr Maxwell Opara Vs Central Bank Of Nig & 6 Ors with Suit No: FH C/ABJ/CS/1847/2022 …. Sitting at Court2 Federal High Court Abuja, Challenging the 1st Respondent Power to Sell Polaris Bank.

The Human Right Activist, Barr Maxwell Opara is Praying the FHC for the following relief against the Respondent as follows. A) AN ORDER OF THIS HONORABLE COURT restraining the 1st, 2nd and 6th Defendants/Respondents from selling Polaris bank, being an asset acquired by the federal government through the 2nd Defendant without compliance with the extant laws, pending the hearing and determination of motion on Notice. B) AND FOR SUCH ORDER OR OTHERS ORDERS as this honorable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. Barr Maxwell Opara humbly submit with respect that the Court can grant these Orders and that this is a proper circumstance based on the depositions in the supporting affidavit where the Court can grant this harmless application in the interest of justice, it is submitted further that, the Court can grant an Order restraining the 1st , 2nd and 6th defendants/Respondents from selling Polaris Bank, being an asset acquired by the Federal government through the 2nd Defendant without compliance with the extant laws, pending the hearing and determination of the Motion on Notice to prevent the happening of an irreversible harm. In the case of Kotoye v. CBN & Ors. SC (1989) 2 LLER 1, PER NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.S.C on the issue of ex-parte application, held thus: "I think it is correct to say that "ex parte" in relation to injunctions is properly used in contradistinction to "on notice" and both expressions, which are mutually exclusive, more strictly rather refer to the manner in which the application is brought and the order procured. An applicant for injunction may bring the application ex parte, that is without notice to the other side or with notice to the other side, as appropriate. By their very nature injunctions granted on ex parte applications can only be properly interim in nature. They are made, without notice to the other side, to keep matters in status quo to a named date, usually not more than a few days, or until the Respondent can be put on notice. The rationale of an order made on such an application is that delay to be caused by proceeding in the ordinary way by putting the other side on notice would or might cause such an irretrievable or serious mischief. Such injunctions are for cases of real urgency. The emphasis is on "real." What is contemplated by the law is urgency between the happening of the event which is sought to be restrained by injunction and the date the application could be heard if taken after Due notice to the other side. Interim injunctions, on the other hand, while often showing the trammels of orders of injunction made ex parte are not necessarily coterminous with them. Their main feature which distinguishes them from interlocutory injunctions is that they are made to preserve the status quo until a named date or until further order or until an application on notice can be heard. They are also for cases of real urgency.... Also, it can be made to avoid such an irretrievable mischief or damage when due to the pressure of business of the court or through no fault of the applicant it is impossible to hear and determine the application on notice for interlocutory injunction. See Beese v. Woodhouse (1970) 1 W.L.R. 586, at p. 590. It must, however, be emphasized that what the court does in such a case is not to hear the application for interlocutory injunction ex parte, behind the back of the respondent, but to make an order which has the effect of preserving the status quo until the application for interlocutory injunction can be heard and determined... For it is settled that a person who seeks an interim order ex parte while also applying for an interlocutory injunction files two motions, simultaneously, one ex parte asking for the interim order, and the other on notice applying for an interlocutory injunction. The court before whom the applications come takes the ex parte motion and, if satisfied that it has merit ex facie, grants it making the order to the date when the motion on notice shall be heard...".